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INTERESTS OF EMPLOYERS AND
EMPLOYEES
Plan sponsors have terminated1 more than five hundred
overfunded pension plans from 1979 to 1985.' These termina-
tions represent approximately four billion dollars in total asset
reversions3 to employers.' In recent years, many pension funds
became overfunded by growing well beyond the value needed to
satisfy current liabilities.' High interest rates and higher than
expected investment yields caused this growth. As a result, these
burgeoning pension funds became attractive sources of cash and
venture capital to their sponsors.6 Without any means to reach
1. For a discussion of what constitutes plan termination, see infra notes 70-80 and
accompanying text.
2. 131 CONG. REC. E2614 (daily ed. June 6, 1985) (extended remarks of Edward
Roybal, Chairman of the House Select Comm. on Aging) [hereinafter cited as Roybal].
United Airlines recently announced plans to terminate "its six pension plans to recap-
ture an estimated $962 million in excess plan assets." Daily Labor Report, No. 113, June
12, 1985, at A-5.
3. Asset reversion refers to an employer's recapture of assets remaining after liabili-
ties to participants and beneficiaries are satisfied in accordance with the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.). See infra notes 30-36 and
accompanying text.
Discussion of restrictions on disposition of excess assets under collective bargaining
agreements is beyond the scope of this Note. For a case discussing the employer's ability
to recapture excess assets from a collectively bargained pension plan, see Washington-
Baltimore Newspaper Guild Local 35 v. Washington Star Co., 555 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C.
1983) (upholding an employer's right to recapture excess assets resulting from actuarial
error), afl'd mem., 729 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
4. If the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) grants currently pending ap-
plications for plan terminations, this total could increase by another $2 billion. Roybal,
supra note 2, at E2615.
5. See Pension Plan Terminations, THE MERCER BULLIN (Nov. 1983), reprinted in
Moratorium on Pension Plan Reversion, 1984: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1984).
6. These excess funds have been used for a range of corporate activities, including
payment of merger and acquisition debts, purchasing company stock to prevent un-
friendly takeover attempts, and improving financial balance sheets to help attract new
capital. See Louis, Tapping the Riches in Company Pension Plans, FossNE, Dec. 26,
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these excess funds, several companies amended their pension
plan provisions to allow for recapture of excess assets in the
event of plan termination.
7
Generally, terminations are of defined benefit pension plans'
that guarantee participants9 a predetermined level of benefits
upon retirement, unless the plan is terminated prior to partici-
pants' retirement. When such a plan becomes overfunded and is
terminated, the plan sponsor1" satisfies accrued liabilities as of
the termination date and recaptures the excess funds that could
have otherwise accrued as some form of future benefits to plan
participants.11 Consequently, the retirement income security of
1983, at 129. Companies may have become more aware of these surplus assets as a result
of a new disclosure requirement of the Financial Accounting Standards Board that re-
quires employers to include the value of pension plan assets and accrued liabilities in
their financial statements. See Grubbs, Termination of Pension Plans with Asset Rever-
sion: A Solution, J. PENSION PLAN. & COMPLIANCE, June 1984, at 199, 201.
7. Generally, courts have upheld the right of employers to amend their pension plans
to allow asset reversion upon termination. See, e.g., Audio Fidelity Corp. v. PBGC, 624
F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding a post-termination amendment improper and thus in-
valid); In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (allowing a
plan amendment prior to termination that provided for reversion of surplus assets), aff'd
mem., 582 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978).
8. For a definition of defined benefit plans, see ERISA § 3(2), (35), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(2), (35) (1982). See also In re Gray-Grimes Tool Co., Inc. Pension Plan, 546 F.
Supp. 102, 107 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (holding that defined benefit plans may also include
plans that promise benefits based on years of service and earnings and that are not fixed
and based on amount contributed).
9. ERISA defines "participant" as:
any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or former
member of an employee organization, who is or may become eligible to receive a
benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which covers employees of
such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries may be
eligible to receive any such benefit.
ERISA § 3(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1982).
10. ERISA defines "plan sponsor" as:
(i) the employer in the case of an employee benefit plan established or main-
tained by a single employer,
(ii) the employee organization in the case of a plan established or maintained
by an employee organization, or
(iii) in the case of a plan established or maintained by two or more employers
or jointly by one or more employers and one or more employee organiza-
tions, the association, committee, joint board of trustees, or other similar
group of representatives of the parties who establish or maintain the
plan.
ERISA § 3(16)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(B) (1982).
11. For instance, these assets might have been used to fund cost-of-living adjust-
ments to retiree benefits. Also, these excess assets, sometimes called "experience gains,"
could have offset the inevitable "experience losses" that occur during poor market condi-
tions. In fact, the primary reason the Internal Revenue Code prohibits the withdrawal of
these excess funds from an active plan is that there must be a cushion of assets to pro-
tect the plan from cyclical market behavior. See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(2) (1982); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401-2 (1980). See also R. LYNN, THE PENSION CRISIS 157 (1983).
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plan participants is diminished when these overfunded plans are
terminated before benefits have fully accrued.12 After termina-
tion, however, some employers institute successor plans1 s or
purchase annuity contracts,"' thereby ensuring a continuation of
coverage for participants under the former plan. Nonetheless,
these post-termination arrangements often do not adequately
compensate plan participants and their beneficiaries for the loss
of anticipated benefits suffered through termination and asset
reversion. 5
The potential adverse impact of plan termination upon the re-
tirement income security of plan participants and their benefi-
ciaries is arguably justified when a clear financial or business ne-
cessity exists. 16 The detrimental effect of a plant closing can be
far more severe than a pension plan termination. Thus, allow-
ance of a plan termination to avoid the loss of numerous jobs is
reasonably justified.
Termination of an overfunded plan and recapture of excess
assets for a reason other than saving a failing company, however,
raises serious issues. The ease with which companies have been
able to terminate overfunded pension plans has generated con-
cern among both legislators and regulators for the retirement in-
come security of terminated plans' participants. In addition,
some of the various termination methods raise the question of
whether a true termination has indeed occurred.1 7 Moreover,
12. See Donlan, Hands in the Cookie Jar: Why Companies are Tapping Their Pen-
sion Funds, BARRON'S, May 21, 1984, at 8; Louis, supra note 6; O'Donnell, Pension
Funds as Profit Centers, FORBES, May 7, 1984, at 35.
13. Many employers are concerned about negative employee reaction to an outright
plan termination, and thus seek to quell such reaction by instituting minimally funded
successor plans and continuing the same level of retirement coverage. Generally, employ-
ees are not even aware of these paper transactions. See Donlan, supra note 12.
14. To guarantee future retirement benefits, recent PBGC guidelines require plan
sponsors to purchase and distribute annuity contracts to plan participants when plans
are terminated. See infra note 38.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 46-64. Cash-out arrangements with lump-sum
distributions are the major sources of inadequate compensation for former plan partici-
pants. 26 U.S.C.A. § 411(a)(7)(B) (West Supp. 1985) allows a plan to involuntarily cash
out the benefit (i.e., pay out the balance of a participant's account to him without his
consent) if the present value of the benefit does not exceed $3,500.
16. Although no such test exists under current law, proposed legislation pending in
Congress would establish a business necessity test. See infra text accompanying notes
95-96.
17. The spinoff and reestablishment termination methods are methods that raise the
most serious doubts about whether a true termination has occurred. The spinoff termina-
tion method essentially splits the current plan into two plans: one for active employees
and one for retired employees. The excess assets are put into the retirees' plan, which is
then terminated. The excess assets are recaptured upon termination of the retirees' plan.
Under the termination reestablishment method, the current overfunded plan is termi-
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whether the plan sponsor should be the beneficiary of a rise in
the market value of plan assets raises a critical issue of fair-
ness. 18 Although the plan sponsor bears all the market risks and
thus should theoretically benefit from a rise in asset values, the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1 (ERISA) declares
that the plan assets are for the exclusive benefit of the partici-
pants.20 Despite these concerns, courts and regulatory agencies
have generally upheld the validity of terminations and asset re-
versions under ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).2'
When Congress enacted ERISA to protect the retirement in-
come of American workers, it did not foresee the dramatic
growth of overfunded pension plans, or the issues such plans
would raise.22 Thus, it is imperative that Congress move swiftly
to enact the necessary legislative reforms to bring about an equi-
table resolution of the issues overfunded plans raise. The Plan
Termination and Reversion Control -Act of 1985,2- a bill now
pending in Congress, is a first step toward resolution of these
issues that affect millions of American workers.
This Note focuses on the problems that often arise for plan
participants when an overfunded defined benefit plan is termi-
nated and the employer recaptures excess assets. Part I explains
the relative ease with which employers can terminate plans and
receive excess assets under current pension law. Part II argues
nated to recover excess assets. Immediately thereafter a new and purportedly compara-
ble successor plan is instituted to replace the former plan. For an explanation of the
various termination methods, see Danker, Pension Plan Terminations and Asset Rever-
sions to Employers, 42 INST. ON FED. TAX'N (Conf. on Employee Benefits and Executive
Compensation) § 3.01, § 3.03[2], at 3-4 (1984).
18. Under current tax law, it is clear that when a pension surplus is due to actuarial
error, the employer benefits from that error. An actuarial error occurs when actual fund-
ing requirements under the plan are different from projected funding requirements. See
26 C.F.R. § 1.401o2(b)(1) (1985).
19. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5,
18, 26, 29, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
20. See infra note 31.
21. See, e.g., Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild Local 35 v. Washington Star
Co., 555 F. Supp. 257 (D.D.C. 1983) (upholding plan amendment permitting reversion),
aff'd mem., 729 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Pollock v. Castrovinci, 476 F. Supp. 606
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (rejecting argument that plan amendment permitting reversion was inef-
fective), aff'd mem., 622 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1980).
As a historical note, in 1938 the Senate rejected, on grounds of fairness, a restriction
on reversion of excess assets to employers. See S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 24
(1938).
22. See Lilly, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 35 LAB. L.J. 603, 607
(1984).
23. H.R. 2701, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 2701]. In addi-
tion, a similar measure was introduced in the Senate as an amendment to the Single-
Employer Pension Plan Termination Insurance Improvements Act of 1983. S. 1227, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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that pension law must be reformed because its shortcomings
threaten American workers' retirement income security, it allows
for sham terminations that remove assets from plans that are, in
fact, ongoing, and it usually allows excess assets to go to employ-
ers rather than employees. Part III discusses two reforms pro-
posed for plan terminations and asset reversions, which are the
Plan Termination and Reversion Control Act of 1985, and condi-
tional employer withdrawals of assets from ongoing plans. Part
III also highlights some of the strengths and weaknesses of these
two policy options.
In keeping with ERISA's original policy objectives, Congress
should act now to reduce employer incentives to terminate
overfunded pension plans. The security of private pension plans
is threatened when employers terminate such plans for the ex-
press purpose of recovering excess assets that ultimately would
have inured to the benefit of plan participants. The Plan Termi-
nation and Reversion Control Act of 1985 is a step in the right
direction, but Congress should consider other viable options,
such as allowing conditional employer withdrawals from active
plans, that go further in accommodating the best interests of
both employers and employees.
I. THE LAW GOVERNING TERMINATION OF PLANS AND ASSET
DISTRIBUTION
In 1974 Congress enacted ERISA to improve and protect the
retirement income of American workers. Inadequacies in state
and federal laws, severe underfunding of some pension plans,
and horrifying accounts of reasonable worker expectations of re-
tirement benefits destroyed by abuse and mismanagement of
plan assets led Congress to revamp the entire pension system. 4
Congress made significant changes in the pension regulatory
scheme2 5 as well as in funding,26 vesting requirements,2 and fi-
duciary standards.28 As a result of these changes, the private
pension system has experienced significant growth in recent
years and is healthier than ever before.2"
24. For a comprehensive legislative history of ERISA, see 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4639.
25. ERISA §§ 3001-3004, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1204 (1982).
26. ERISA §8 301-306, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (1982).
27. ERISA 38 201-211, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1982).
28. ERISA §§ 401-414, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1982).
29. At the end of 1983, assets of private pension plans amounted to $900 billion and
FALL 1985]
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 19:1
ERISA clearly allows for voluntary plan termination.3" Plan
termination triggers a specific exception to the exclusive benefit
rule of ERISA,31 thus allowing the employer to utilize plan as-
sets that otherwise would have benefited plan participants. In
particular, the Act provides that any residual assets remaining
after plan termination may be distributed to the employer if all
current and contingent liabilities of the plan have been satis-
fied,32 the distribution does not violate any existing law, 3  and
the plan includes a provision allowing for such a distribution.34
If the residual assets are a result of actuarial error, however, the
employer has an exclusive right to recapture them.35 After all
liabilities are satisfied, if any of the residual assets are attributa-
ble to employee contributions they must be equitably distrib-
uted to the employees. a Thus, it is clear that the employer and
the employees each have only a qualified right to some portion
of the excess assets of a terminated plan.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the gov-
ernment insurance agency that protects plan participants' ac-
crued benefits,37 has recently announced new guidelines that rec-
ognize the right of employers to recover excess assets upon
termination if certain conditions are satisfied.38 These guidelines
were expected to grow to $3 trillion by 1985. Moratorium on Pension Plan Reversions:
Hearings on S. 2435 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, 14 (1984) (statement of Raymond Donovan,
Secretary of Labor) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2435].
30. ERISA §§ 4042, 4044, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1342, 1344 (1982).
31. The exclusive benefit rule states: "[E]xcept as provided in paragraph (2), (3), or
(4) or subsection (d) of this section, or under §§ 1342 [ERISA § 4042] and 1344 [ERISA
§ 4044] (relating to termination of insured plans) of this title, the assets of a plan shall
never inure to the benefit of any employer ..... ERISA § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1103(c)(1) (1982).
32. ERISA § 4044(d)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(1)(A) (1982).
33. ERISA § 4044(d)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(1)(B) (1982).
34. ERISA § 4044(d)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(1)(C) (1982).
35. See supra note 18.
36. ERISA § 4044(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(2) (1982).
37. See generally ERISA §§ 4001-4009, 4021-4023, 4041-4048, 4061-4068, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1309, 1321-1323, 1341-1348, 1361-1368 (1982) for the statutory provisions gov-
erning the PBGC.
38. The new PBGC guidelines regarding plan termination and recovery of excess as-
sets provide that:
(1) All participants' benefits must be fully vested, and annuity contracts
must be purchased for and distributed to plan participants.
(2) The amount of any lump-sum payments must fairly reflect the value of
the pension to the individual.
(3) Termination re-establishment transactions are permitted, and the new
plan may grant past service credit. The successor plan will be exempt
from the five-year phase-in of PBGC benefit guarantees that apply to
newly established plans.
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set forth new funding requirements aimed at protecting mini-
mum funding standards for plans established after the termina-
tion of a previously overfunded plan. Some critics, however; ar-
gue that these new funding requirements have no basis in
current statutory law and thus are arguably unenforceable.39
Moreover, the guidelines have been challenged for not explicitly
addressing the issue of whether a termination has actually oc-
curred when it spins off"0 another plan or reestablishes a plan
after a termination.4'
Another of the guidelines' flaws is that they do not mandate
that a plan grant credit to plan participants for past service,42
but simply allow employers to grant such credit.43 The absence
of past service credit in a successor plan could arguably result in
a diminution in the amount of retirement benefits an employee
otherwise would have earned under the terminated plan.44 In ad-
dition, the absence of past service credit in a successor plan
might put the PBGC at a greater risk of having to save a plan
that is only minimally funded in the event of a sharp decline in
the market value of plan assets.
(4) Spinoff/terminations are permitted only if benefits of all employees are
fully vested as of the date of termination, all accrued benefits in the
ongoing plan are provided for by the purchase of annuity contracts, and
employees are given advance notice of the transaction.
(5) An employer that terminates a plan under a spinoff/termination or termi-
nation/re-establishment transaction generally may not engage in either
transaction again for 15 years.
(6) In spinoff/terminations, and termination/re-establishment transactions
where credit is given for past service, amortization periods must be
changed resulting in a change in funding method. These changes in fund-
ing method must be approved by the Service.
(7) The federal income tax consequences of the receipt of reversions, of de-
ductions for contributions to ongoing or successor plans, and of the fund-
ing of such plans, after the change in funding method, are unchanged by
these guidelines.
See Dankner, supra note 17, § 3.04, at 3-8, 3-9.
39. See, e.g., D. Grubbs, Recommended Policies for Pension Plan Terminations with
Reversion of Assets 4 (May 11, 1984) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
40. This is referred to as a spinoff termination. See Roybal, supra note 2, at E2616.
41. This is referred to as a reestablishment termination. Id.
42. Id.
Past service credit generally refers to the number of years of service an employee may
have prior to the establishment of a plan. The employer may count those years for the
purpose of determining vesting rights under the plan. D. DUNKLE, GUIDE TO PENSION AND
PROFIT SHARING PLANS § 4.03, at 4-6 (1984).
43. This problem would be remedied by the Plan Termination and Reversion Control
Act of 1985, H.R. 2701, supra note 23, which mandates the inclusion of past service
credit from a previous plan into a successor plan. See Roybal, supra note 2, at E2615.
44. See Roybal, supra note 2, at E2616.
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II. POLICY CONCERNS OF THE LAW GOVERNING PLAN
TERMINATION AND ASSET DISTRIBUTION
The recent growth in plan terminations and asset reversions
has raised three major policy concerns. First, terminations have
threatened the retirement income security of many Americans.
Second, under the guise of terminations employers have circum-
vented ERISA's prohibition against removing assets from ongo-
ing plans. 5 Third, terminations have raised the question of
whether excess plan assets belong to employers or employees. In
spite of the concerns termination practices raise, federal agen-
cies charged with the responsibility of administering ERISA
have upheld the validity of these practices.
A. Retirement Income Security
Plan terminations can place some employees in a less finan-
cially secure retirement position than they were before the ter-
mination. One way this can happen is by giving them lump-sum
payments that do not accurately reflect the present value of
their accrued benefits. District 65, UAW v. Harper & Row, Pub-
lishers, Inc.4" illustrates the financial harm lump-sum payments
can cause employees whose pension plans are terminated.
Harper & Row sought to finance a stock purchase, in part, by
terminating its defined benefit plan.47 The company filed notice
with the PBGC48 and submitted an application to the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) for a determination that the plan termi-
nation would not result in a loss of the plan's tax qualified sta-
tus.4' Both the PBGC and the IRS granted approval for pro-
45. See supra note 31.
46. 576 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
47. The financing plan for this stock purchase also included the sale of real property,
the purchase of company stock by the employee profit-sharing plan, and loans. Id. at
1473.
48. ERISA requires that the employer file with the PBGC a Notice of Intent to ter-
minate a defined benefit plan 10 days prior to the proposed termination date. After re-
ceiving this Notice of Intent, the PBGC issues a Notice of Sufficiency if it has approved
the termination. ERISA § 4041(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1982). If the assets of a termi-
nated plan are insufficient to satisfy accrued benefits, the PBGC satisfies those benefits.
The employer, however, remains liable to the PBGC for up to 30% of the employer's net
worth. See ERISA §§ 4001-4201, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1381 (1982).
49. For a critical analysis of IRS review procedures for terminating pension plans, see
generally M. SOCOLAR, TAX REVENUES LOST AND BENEFICIARIES INADEQUATELY PROTECTED




ceeding with the plan termination.5
The company implemented a plan to meet the benefit needs
of three different groups of employees after the termination. 1
First, employees whose benefits had an accrued present value of
less than $250 were required to accept a lump-sum payment.62
Second, employees whose benefits had an accrued present value
of between $250 and $1,000 had the choice of receiving either a
lump-sum payment or an annuity.5 3 Third, employees whose
benefits had an accrued present value of more than $1,000 were
required to accept an annuity.54 Under this arrangement the
company recaptured approximately $9 million after the plan
termination.
5 5
The court recognized the company's absolute right to termi-
nate the plan" and held that the decision to terminate the pen-
sion plan did not constitute a breach of any fiduciary duty under
ERISA.57 The court, however, found merit in the plaintiff's argu-
ment that the distribution of excess assets upon termination was
inequitable." In denying the company's motions for summary
judgment, the court concluded that at least two issues of fact
existed which suggested that the distribution of assets was un-
fair. First, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the amount
of information the company provided may not have been suffi-
cient for them to make an informed choice about their benefit
options. In particular, the company did not disclose that it
used a fifteen percent interest rate assumption to value the
lump-sum payments.60 If this disclosure had been made, some
employees would have rejected the lump-sum payment in favor
50. 576 F. Supp. at 1473. The PBGC has discretionary power to restore a terminated
plan to active status if it determines that reasonable actuarial assumptions were not used
to value accrued benefits. ERISA § 4047,- 29 U.S.C. § 1347 (1982). In Harper & Row
plaintiffs filed individual complaints against the PBGC, alleging that the PBGC's Notice
of Sufficiency was issued without a finding that the plan termination was based upon
reasonable interest rate assumptions. 576 F. Supp. at 1484.
51. Upon termination of a plan, the employer can satisfy plan liabilities either
through cash distributions equal to the present value of accrued benefits or through the
purchase of annuity contracts from an insurance company thereby guaranteeing future
retirement benefits. Rev. Rul. 83-52, 1983-1 I.R.B. 87.
52. 576 F. Supp. at 1479.
53. Id.
54. Id. The court decided that ERISA does not require an employer to purchase indi-
vidual annuity contracts rather than group contracts as Harper & Row did.
55. 576 F. Supp at 1473-74.
56. Id. at 1476-77.
57. Id. at 1478.
58. Id. at 1479.
59. Id. at 1480.
60. Id.
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of the annuity, because they would have thought the interest
rate was too high and therefore gave them an unrealistically low
present value for their retirement benefits.
Second, a question of fact existed regarding whether the fif-
teen percent interest rate assumption was reasonable in view of
the economic conditions prevailing at the time. 1 The plaintiffs
contended that the company had used an artificially high inter-
est rate assumption to reduce the present value of accrued bene-
fits, and thus maximized the excess assets upon termination.2
Employees who received lump-sum payments ultimately realized
that they could reasonably expect only about a seven percent
return on those payments.63 Consequently, those employees
could not enter the private market and buy annuity contracts
equivalent to their accrued benefits under the terminated plan
because of this unrealistic interest rate assumption."
As Harper & Row illustrates, plan terminations can place
some employees in a less financially secure retirement position
than they were before the termination. Employees who receive
lump-sum payments may later realize that these payments do
not accurately reflect the present value of their accrued benefits.
In short, these employees cannot use their lump-sum payments
to secure their future retirement income to the extent the termi-
nated plan did.
The retirement income security of employees may also be im-
paired when defined benefit plans are replaced with defined con-
tribution plans. 5 With a defined contribution plan, employees
are not guaranteed any fixed benefit upon retirement. Employer
contributions, however, are fixed for the long term, and retire-
ment benefits become a function of the sufficiency of these con-
tributions and of market conditions.6 In essence, the defined
contribution plan shifts market risks away from the employer
and onto the employees.
Individual terminations affect the retirement income security
61. Id. The reasonableness standard for interest rate assumptions is set forth in 29
C.F.R. § 2619.26(c)(2) (1985).
62. 576 F. Supp. at 1479.
63. For instance, an employee receiving a $700 lump-sum payment for his accrued
benefit based on 12 years of service under the Harper & Row plan would have been
required to pay approximately $7000 to purchase a life annuity at that time. See Roybal,
supra note 2, at E2616.
64. Id.
65. For most major industries, defined benefit plans have been the rule and defined
contribution plans the exception. Thus, a change from defined benefit to defined contri-
bution plans is a significant one for employers in some industries. BUCK CONSULTANTS,
FOR YOUa BENEFIT No. 79, UTILIZING "SuRPLUS" PENSION PLAN ASSETS 3-4 (April 1984).
66. See Grubbs, supra note 6, at 200.
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of individual employees, but the increase in the number of plan
terminations is likely to diminish the security of the plan termi-
nation insurance system, thus affecting many more employees
than those whose plans are terminated. The PBGC premium
level is determined by the number of plan participants covered
by private defined benefit plans,67 so it will increase as the num-
ber of such plans and participants decreases through termina-
tions." Thus, if the number of terminations of overfunded and
otherwise healthy pension plans continues rising, then the pre-
mium levels for continuing plans will be forced upward. Spiral-
ing premium levels will divert some funds away from building
plan assets, and thus ultimately reduce benefit levels for retir-
ees. Moreover, high insurance premiums may make some em-
ployers reluctant to establish defined benefit plans. 9
The rise in plan terminations causes valid concern for the re-
tirement income security of employees as well as the plan termi-
nation insurance system itself. It is imperative that Congress act
to stem the tide of terminations through changes in pension law.
These changes should reduce employer incentives for terminat-
ing overfunded pension plans, while accommodating employers
who need excess plan assets for legitimate business necessities.
B. Spinoff and Reestablishment Terminations
An employer cannot withdraw assets from an ongoing plan,70
so determination of whether a plan termination has actually oc-
curred can be important."1 Generally, whether a plan termina-
tion has occurred depends upon the facts and circumstances of
each alleged termination.7 2 A decision about whether a termina-
tion has occurred is often difficult to make when an employer
has used either the spinoff73 or reestablishment methods of ter-
mination. 7" These methods essentially allow an employer to ter-
minate partially the current plan, withdraw the excess assets,
and continue a minimally funded successor plan purportedly
67. See D. DUNKLE, supra note 42, § 4.17, at 4-24.
68. See Grubbs, supra note 6, at 202.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 31.
71. It is only through termination that an employer can reach excess assets for its
own purposes. Thus, this is the exception to the exclusive benefit rule. Id.
72. See Tress. Reg. § 1.401-6(b) (1963).
73. See supra note 17.
74. Id.
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comparable to the terminated plan .7 Thus, the question these
transactions present is whether they exalt form over substance
in violation of ERISA's prohibition against withdrawing assets
from ongoing plans.76
Initially, the IRS was concerned that the spinoff and reestab-
lishment terminations were vehicles for avoiding the tax conse-
quences of asset reversion following plan termination.7 No evi-
dence, however, demonstrates that tax considerations play a
major role in employers' plan termination decisions.7 8 Recently,
the IRS has questioned whether novel termination methods are
consistent with ERISA's minimum funding requirements. 9
When excess assets have been withdrawn from a terminated
pension plan and a minimally funded successor plan put in
place, there is the risk that the absence of an asset cushion will
cause the underfunding of accrued benefits. Despite these con-
cerns, the recent PBGC guidelines legitimize spinoff and rees-
tablishment terminations."0 Thus, current law allows employers
to accomplish indirectly what they could not accomplish
directly.
C. Allocation of the Benefits from a Rise in the Market
Value of Plan Assets
When a pension plan becomes overfunded because of an unex-
pected rise in the market value of plan assets, generally the em-
ployer can reap the benefit of this excess value.81 Employers ar-
gue that they should realize the excess value because under
defined benefit plans they bear the risk of a drop in the value of
plan assets. Thus, it is only fair that they benefit from a rise in
those assets' value.82 Consequently, employees are not rewarded
75. Id.
76. Arguably these transactions accomplish indirectly, in two steps, what could not
have been accomplished directly in one step.
77. See Pension Funding Problems: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on
Aging, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1982) (prepared statement of Ira Cohen, Director, Actu-
arial Division, Internal Revenue Service) [hereinafter cited as Cohen statement].
78. See Grubbs, supra note 6, at 203-04.
79. See Cohen statement, supra note 77, at 115-16.
80. See supra note 38.
81. See, e.g., In re C.D. Moyer Co. Trust Fund, 441 F. Supp. 1128, 1132-33 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (concluding that employees should not benefit from the miscalculations of the em-
ployer), afl'd, 582 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978). But see Surplus Assets: Benefits for Whom?,
PENSIONS & INVESTMENT AGE, Feb. 7, 1983, at 10.
82. Hearings on S. 2435, supra note 29, at 52, 59 (statement of Ed Davey, Exec. Dir.
of Assoc. of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, Inc.).
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for employers' risk-taking.8s This position is supportable under
ERISA because the Act carves out a specific exception to the
exclusive benefit rule in the event of plan termination.
8 4
On the other hand, employees and their supporters argue that
the excess assets in an overfunded plan represent cost-of-living
protection for retiree benefits and that had ERISA required em-
ployers to grant cost-of-living increases, these excess assets
would not exist.8 5 Moreover, these excess assets may benefit em-
ployer and employee alike in the event of a sudden drop in the
value of plan assets by protecting the plan against potential
funding deficiencies. Thus, there is some basis for arguing that
these excess assets should be distributed to plan participants
upon termination of an overfunded plan.
ERISA provides that upon termination of a plan any excess
assets attributable to employee contributions should be equita-
bly distributed to the employees.86 In contributory plans, which
require employee contributions as a precondition to participa-
tion, employee contributions typically become fully vested8 and
nonforfeitable, so the employer cannot receive any excess as-
sets.88 There also are contributory defined benefit plans that
provide for voluntary or mandatory employee contributions.8 9
Thus, for such plans, it is conceivable that a portion of the ex-
cess assets would be attributable to employee contributions and
therefore distributable to employees.
III. LEGISLATIVE POLICY OPTIONS
The Plan Termination and Reversion Control Act of 198590
83. Id.
84. See supra note 31.
85. M. Gordon, Terminations of Overfunded Defined Benefit Plans 10-11 (statement
before the Joint Hearing of the House Select Comm. on Aging and the Subcomm. on
Labor-Management Relations) (June 12, 1985) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
86. ERISA § 4044(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(2) (1982).
87. ERISA defines "vested liabilities" as "the present value of the immediate or de-
ferred benefits available at normal retirement age for participants and their beneficiaries
which are nonforfeitable." ERISA § 3(25), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(25) (1982).
88. 26 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982). For an excellent overview of employee contributions
to plans, see D. DUNKLE, supra note 42, §§ 14.01-.06, at 14-1 to 14-12 (1984).
89. Id. §§ 14.02-.04, at 14-2 to 14-9. In such cases, the proportion of excess plan as-
sets attributable to employee contributions is easily determinable. In reality, however,
even with plans that are funded solely by employer contributions, arguably employees
carry the burden of these contributions through reduced wage rates. Thus, it is unclear
how one can draw a clear line between employee and employer contributions.
90. H.R. 2701, supra note 23.
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and conditional employer withdrawals from ongoing plans have
been proposed to curb the growth of pension plan terminations
with asset reversions to employers. In spite of concern for em-
ployees' retirement income security, it is clearly inadvisable to
amend current law to prohibit absolutely plan terminations with
asset reversions to employers. Such a drastic legislative measure
would inevitably result in a reluctance among employers to es-
tablish defined benefit plans because they perceive the ability to
recapture excess plan assets as one of the advantages of such
plans.9 Instead, current law should be changed to the extent
necessary to reduce employer incentives to terminate
overfunded pension plans. The Plan Termination and Reversion
Control Act of 1985 and conditional employer withdrawals from
ongoing plans seek to accommodate the best interests of both
employers and employees in regard to plan terminations.
A. The Plan Termination and Reversion Control Act of 1985
In response to public concern about the escalating number of
plan terminations within the last few years,9" Representative
Roybal recently introduced H.R. 2701. 93 The bill seeks to create
a federal policy that protects the retirement income security of
workers from the danger plan terminations and asset reversions
pose.
94
The bill's main feature is a business necessity test that allows
plan terminations prompted by impending bankruptcy, financial
insolvency, or other business hardship.95 Moreover, it is clear
under this bill that termination of a pension plan to recapture
assets for a corporate purpose, such as thwarting takeover at-
tempts, would not constitute a business necessity.96 A plan ter-
mination meeting the business necessity test, however, will allow
the plan sponsor to establish a comparable successor plan that
preserves the pretermination present value of participants' bene-
fits.9" This provision would help prevent reductions in retire-
91. See Hearings on S. 2435, supra note 29, at 58 (statement of Ed Davey, Exec. Dir.
of Assoc. of Private Pension and Welfare Plans, Inc.).
92. See Roybal, supra note 2, at E2614-19.
93. Rep. Roybal introduced the bill on June 6, 1985. 131 CONG. REc. H4015 (daily ed.
June 6, 1985).
94. See Roybal, supra note 2, at E2615.
95. H.R. 2701, supra note 23, § 4. A business necessity termination, however, is not
allowed within the first five years of a plan. Id.
96. Id.
97. The bill requires that a successor plan meet certain requirements, such as provid-
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ment benefits due to insufficient lump-sum cash payments made
following a plan termination, as in Harper & Row.
A shortcoming of the bill is that it does not address the issue
of the appropriate actuarial and interest rate assumptions that
should be used in determining the present value of pretermina-
tion benefits. In cases of mandatory lump-sum cash payments, it
is particularly important that these assumptions be fair and re-
alistic. Otherwise, recipients of these payments are left without
sufficient means for providing for their future retirement.
Plan terminations that do not meet the business necessity test
would result in the ratable distribution of any excess assets to
both active and retired plan participants.9 8 Failure to make this
distribution would constitute a fiduciary violation under
ERISA. 9 Any amount of excess assets not distributed to plan
participants in a nonbusiness necessity termination would be
subject to a ten percent excise tax. 00 This tax would be calcu-
lated as ten percent of the fair market value of the assets recap-
tured by the employer.101 The question arises, however, whether
this ten percent tax is enough of a deterrent to prevent employ-
ers from taking the risk of recapturing assets that should have
been distributed to plan participants. An employer who stands
to recapture several million dollars in plan assets may not balk
at a ten percent penalty for doing so. Thus, perhaps this tax
should be higher to prevent employers from easily incorporating
it into the costs of the plan termination.
10 2
Another major problem under current practice that this bill
severely limits is the ability of employers to engage in spinoff or
termination reestablishment schemes.103 If a plan terminates
without meeting the business necessity test, the bill prohibits
the employer from instituting a comparable plan for a five-year
ing for past service credit and providing benefits not less than those under the termi-
nated plan. See Roybal, supra note 2, at E2615.
98. H.R. 2701, supra note 23, § 4.
99. Roybal, supra note 2, at E2615.
100. H.R. 2701, supra note 23, § 7.
101. Id.
102. The ten percent excise tax applies to terminations that meet the business neces-
sity test as well as those that do not. Id. Although one could argue that the tax deters all
terminations, not just those for nonbusiness necessities, the tax appears to be designed
to prevent nonbusiness necessity terminations because they comprise the majority of ter-
minations. See Roybal, supra note 2, at E2617. Another reason why the tax's purpose
appears to be to deter nonbusiness necessity terminations is that plan sponsors with a
great need for funds may have no choice but to terminate the plan, while sponsors who
want to terminate for a nonbusiness necessity reason do not feel compelled to terminate
the plan and therefore may be influenced by the tax.
103. For a discussion of these schemes, see supra note 17.
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period.104 Even if a business necessity exists for the termination,
comparable successor plans established within five years after
termination become subject to expedited funding schedules to
guarantee an adequate cushion of assets for funding future
benefits.
1 0 5
Although restrictions on the ability of employers to establish
comparable successor plans after a nonbusiness necessity termi-
nation are responsive to a major problem, this provision of the
bill may encourage employers to establish defined contribution
plans following plan termination, because they are not covered
by the provisions of ERISA or the qualified trust section of the
IRC.106 Because of the uncertainty that such plans present for
employees,10 7 it is clearly in the best interests of employees to
reduce the incentives of employers to terminate their current de-
fined benefit plans.
Although this bill offers some viable solutions to many of the
problems of plan terminations and asset reversions, it fails to
reduce adequately the incentives for termination and subse-
quent establishment of defined contribution plans. Instead, the
bill makes the termination of defined benefit plans riskier for
employers because of the restricted access to excess plan assets
upon termination. Thus, the bill encourages the establishment of
defined contribution plans that impose substantial risk and un-
certainty on the covered employees.
B. Conditional Employer Withdrawals from Ongoing Plans
In an effort to reduce employer incentives to terminate merely
to recapture excess assets, it has been proposed that ERISA and
the IRC be amended to allow conditional employer withdrawals
of assets from ongoing plans.108 This proposal is the most attrac-
tive way to allow employers to capture excess assets because,
when a business necessity exists, it would allow an employer to
use the excess assets without terminating the plan. Although the
excess assets remain for the benefit of employees, an employer
104. See Roybal, supra note 2, at E2618; H.R. 2701, supra note 23, § 6.
105. H.R. 2701, supra note 23, § 6.
106. 26 U.S.C. § 412(h), (i) (1982) excepts from minimum funding standards certain
profit-sharing plans, employee stock purchase plans, and plans funded through insurance
contracts, all of which are forms of defined contribution plans that are becoming increas-
ingly popular among large employers.
107. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
108. See Grubbs, supra note 6, at 202-03.
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may use the funds under specific conditions. As a result, the is-
sue of fairness to the employees is indirectly resolved because
the assets are returned to the plan for plan participants.
The major weakness of this proposal is the potential danger it
poses to the security of accrued benefits. As a response to this
potential problem, the proposal contains three qualifications for
withdrawals from an overfunded, ongoing plan. First, the
amount withdrawn from the plan could not exceed the value of
all accrued benefits. 10 9 Thus, the accrued benefits of plan par-
ticipants would remain fully funded. Second, withdrawals from
the plan would be treated as actuarial losses and thus amortized
over the usual fifteen-year period." 0 Third, an employer would
be required to protect accrued benefits against a precipitous
drop in the value of plan assets that could occur soon after the
withdrawal."' This protection would take the form of a cushion
of assets of a value greater than the value of the accrued bene-
fits." 2 This cushion would afford added protection to accrued
benefits and future benefits as well by providing additional
funds in the event of a sudden drop in the value of plan
assets. "
Although clearly prohibited under current law," 4 this proposal
provides some flexibility for accommodating the needs of em-
ployers while protecting employees from the possibility of plan
termination. Because of the inherent potential for abuse in al-
lowing such a practice, it would be critically important that the
business necessity test be strictly applied in these circumstances.
It is also important that employers are limited in the number
and amount of withdrawals allowed over a specified period of
time. Otherwise, withdrawals of plan assets by employers could
become as threatening to the retirement income security of em-
ployees as are asset reversions under the current practice.
CONCLUSION
In view of the enormous growth in overfunded plan termina-
tions, significant legislative and administrative reforms are nec-
109. Id. at 202.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 203.
112. Id. at 202-03.
113. Id. at 203.
114. Under current law, assets may be distributed to employers only in the event of
plan terminations. See supra note 31.
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essary to resolve the current inequities. Unless these reforms are
instituted, the retirement income security of millions of Ameri-
can workers will be jeopardized.
The Plan Termination and Reversion Control Act of 1985 is a
step in the right direction for reforming current pension law, but
it lacks sufficient incentives to keep employers from terminating
defined benefit plans that are in the best interests of employees.
Indeed, the bill, by making it more difficult to reach plan assets,
could even make employers reluctant to establish such a plan in
the first instance.
The proposal for allowing conditional withdrawal of assets
from an ongoing plan holds substantial promise for significantly
reducing employer incentives to engage in plan termination. By
allowing employers to withdraw assets from an ongoing plan, the
proposal seeks to accommodate the legitimate business needs of
employers in financial distress. A strict set of rules and guide-
lines, however, is necessary to ensure that such a practice would
not become abusive and detrimental to the retirement income
security of plan participants.
-Carl A. Butler*
* Associate Note Editor, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
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